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I. Introduction
A. United Nations Arms Trade Treaty
The United Nations has spent the better part of the last century attempting to
foster diplomacy and understanding between the nations of the world. It has
succeeded in bringing together nations that have been bitter enemies, nations that
have refused to meet unilaterally with foes, and nations that want to change the
world without picking up a weapon. Although sometimes it may be necessary to
weaponize to defend one's ideals, what happens when those weapons are turned
on the innocent, the undeserving, or the unprotected? What has happened is that
at least a quarter of a million people have been killed annually in armed conflicts
around the globe since 1989, with many of those deaths being facilitated by the
trade in conventional arms.' Therefore, the United Nations sees fit to address
this situation, as it remains largely problematic in many regions of the world.
The United Nations (U.N.) is currently working on drafting an Arms Trade
Treaty (ATT) that will attempt to not only codify the large weapons that have
been at issue in the past, but also the Small Arms and Light Weapons ("SA/LW")
that have become the scourge of third-world countries and the deadliest of
weaponry.2
The U.N. created an ATT Preparatory Committee that met most recently on
July 11-15, 2011.3 Since 2009, the committee has been meeting "to examine the
feasibility, scope and draft parameters for a comprehensive, legally binding in-
strument establishing common international standards for the import, export and
transfer of conventional arms. . .. "4 The U.N. established July 2012 as the target
date to pass the ATT, with ratification by signatory nations in the months
following.5
B. United States Position on an ATT
United States Secretary of State, Hillary Rodham Clinton, has stated that the
U.S. "is committed to actively pursuing a strong and robust treaty that contains
the highest possible legally binding standards for the international transfer of
I Killer Facts, The Impact of the Irresponsible Arms Trade on Lives, Rights and Livelihoods, AM-
NESTY INT'L 4 (May 2010) (Index No. ACT 30/005/2010), http://controlarms.org/wordpress/wp-content/
uploads/2011/03/killerfacts-en.pdf.
2 U.N. Group of Governmental Experts on Arms Trade, Rep., transmitted by letter dated Aug. 8,
2008 from the Chairperson of the Group of Governmental Experts established pursuant to General As-
sembly resolution 61/89 (2006) concerning an Arms Trade Treaty addressed to the Secretary-General, 1
21, 23, U.N. Doc A/63/334, 63rd Sess. (Aug. 26, 2008) [hereinafter Report of GGE].
3 U.N. Arms Trade Treaty Preparatory Committee: Meeting Dates, UNITED NATIONS, http://www.
un.org/disarmament/convarms/ATTPrepCom/index.htm (last visited Oct. 3, 2011).
4 Rep. of the Open-ended Working Group towards an Arms Trade Treaty, July 13-17, 2009, U.N.
Doc. A/AC.277/2009/1, 2d. Sess. (July 20, 2009).
5 See generally UNIrED NATIONS ARMS TRADE TREATY PREPARATORY COMMITTEE WEBSrTE, http://
www.un.org/disarmament/convarms/ATrPrepCom/ (last visited Nov. 11, 2011).
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conventional weapons." 6 The U.S. for the first time in more than a decade is
open to the possibility of supranational arms control, a large diplomatic step that
will strengthen several areas of interest for the American government.
Secretary Clinton, however, also understands that this will not be an easy task,
and a useless ATT will be no better than no treaty at all. Secretary Clinton stated
that the U.S. will actively support the negotiations so long as "the Conference
operates under the rule of consensus decision-making needed to ensure that all
countries can be held to standards that will actually improve the global situa-
tion. . ."7 Therefore, it will be important for the United States to take an active
role in the formation of this treaty, especially by participating over the next two
years and garnering support in the international community.
The U.S. is seeking a treaty that will make concrete strides in the area of arms
control and protect those who are the senseless victims of unsafe weapons trad-
ing. Ellen Tauscher, the U.S. Under Secretary for Arms Control and Interna-
tional Security stated, "What we are after is a means to have all nations do what
the United States already does: examine each conventional weapons transfer
before it is authorized to be certain that it will enhance. . .not under-
mine. . .security and stability."8
C. The U.S. Must Take an Active Leadership Role in Developing the ATT
The U.S. has taken the first step to making the ATT a reality, namely, it has
publicly expressed support for its passage. Now, in order to unmistakably back
its public support, the U.S. must take the next step and actively participate in the
stages of development and writing, as well as international lobbying and negotia-
tions that will result in an effective treaty.
The U.S., however, need not look at the ATT as a moral project; rather, it will
enhance several legitimate goals that the U.S. government would like to reach.
Therefore, this paper proposes that the objectives of the U.S. will be furthered in
a number of ways by its active participation in the negotiations and ratification of
the U.N. Arms Trade Treaty. First, an ATT will quell terrorism and regional
conflicts. Second, the ATT can ensure the safety of millions of citizens in vari-
ous countries where arms trafficking has led to a rash of organized killings and
genocidal-type deaths. And third, an ATT will allow the U.S. to strengthen alli-
ances and potentially make new ones as the negotiations progress and diplomacy
is furthered among participant nations.
It will not be a simple, straightforward path, however. The U.S. must be will-
ing to negotiate with countries with which it typically does not have an open
dialogue. This will be necessary as the U.S. has much at stake in the develop-
ment of this treaty. For instance, the U.S. must protect legitimate weapons sales
because it is vital to its economy, as evidenced by the fact that the U.S. is the
6 Press Release, Hillary Rodham Clinton, Sec'y, of State, U.S. Support for the Arms Trade Treaty
(Oct. 14, 2009), available at http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2009a/10/130573.htm.
7 Id.
8 Ellen Tauscher, Under Sec'y for Arms Control & Int'l Sec., U.S. State Dep't, Arms Trade Treaty
Remarks at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (Feb. 18, 2010).
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leading arms exporter in the world, responsible for 30% of the world's arms
exports from 2006 to 2010.9 At the same time, concessions may be necessary to
ensure a respectable number of signatories. If the ATT is ratified by a only small
percentage of nations, it will carry no more weight than past U.N. Arms Traffick-
ing agreements.
By way of a roadmap, this article will, in Section II, give a background on the
historical development of arms trade agreements previously employed. Section
III will discuss the state of current global arms trade control. Next, Section IV
will address what is being proposed for inclusion in the United Nations Arms
Trade Treaty, as well as why those elements are crucial for the overall success
and implementation of that treaty. Section V will propose several reasons why
the United States will benefit from active participation in the ATT negotiations,
along with pinpointing potential regional conflicts that would be impacted by the
new treaty. And finally, a short conclusion in Section VI will emphasize how the
U.S. government can go about implementing the treaty both at home and abroad.
II. Background
In order to understand why the Arms Trade Treaty is both desirable and press-
ing, it is necessary to give a timeline of the historical development of arms con-
trol at the international level. As discussed in the following section, history
shows that now is the time to take action because the world is ready for a com-
prehensive arms trade treaty.
A. Historical Calls for Arms Control in the U.N.
After World War II, the Cold War brought attention to the problems that arise
when arms stockpiling becomes commonplace. The arms race between the
United States and the Soviet Union led to the First Special Session on Disarma-
ment (SSODI) in 1978.10 However, the first SSODI was, essentially, an admis-
sion of the failure of the declared "Decade of Disarmament" that had begun in
1969, as the U.N. realized that disarmament was likely further away in 1978 than
it was in 1969.11
At the same time, there was worldwide growth in awareness about nuclear
weapons.' 2 This newfound fear of nuclear weapons, predicated on the destruc-
tion that took place in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, led to a movement for nuclear
disarmament that took center stage as the U.S. and Soviet Union stockpiled these
9 14 March 2011: India world's largest arms importer according to new SIPRI data on interna-
tional arms transfers, STOCKHOLM INT'L PEACE RESEARCH INST., http://www.sipri.org/media/pressre-
leases/armstransfers (last visited Nov. 11, 2011).
10 First Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to Disarmament, Final Document of
SSOD-I: Resolutions and Decisions of the Tenth Special Session, T 1-2, U.N. Doc. A/S - 10/4 (1978),
available at http://www.un.org/disarmament/HomePAge/SSOD.ssod4-documents.shtml. Report of the
First Special Session on Disarmament.
I1 Id. at 17.
12 Id.
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weapons of mass destruction.' 3 But all of the activists had basically failed when
it came to the arms race. They all focused on nuclear weapons and the devasta-
tion that a single bomb could inflict, while small arms and conventional weapons
were brushed aside despite the fact that these weapons would go on to kill far
more people than nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons combined over the
next several decades.14
In response to the growing concern over all types of weapons, the U.N.
adopted two instruments aimed at promoting transparency on military matters
and conventional arms transfers: the 1980 U.N. Standardized Instrument for Re-
porting Military Expenditures and the 1991 U.N. Register of Conventional
Arms.15 Additionally, in 1991, the U.N. Security Council adopted Guidelines for
Conventional Arms Transfers.16
The 1991 Register of Conventional Arms ("the Register") is viewed as the
forerunner to the upcoming ATT.17 The Register covered seven categories of
weapons: battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, large-caliber artillery systems,
combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, and missiles." However, despite
initial optimism in the international community, the Register is generally viewed
as a failure' 9 because although the international community had assented to
transparency in arms transfers, there was no useful data harvesting mechanism
and no way to follow the transfers in order to monitor a potentially destabilizing
build-up of arms. 20
B. A Renewed Call for Arms Control
Over a decade into the 21st century, SA/LW have increasingly threatened se-
curity in several conflict regions around the world, as well as fueling terrorism all
over. At the turn of the millennium, the U.N. once again began discussing what
it could do to help stem the tide of weapons reaching the hands of groups who
intended to violate basic principles of human rights. Therefore, "[r]ecognizing
that the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects sustains
conflicts, exacerbates violence, contributes to the displacement of civilians.. .and
fuels crime and terrorism," the U.N. embarked on several initiatives to aid the
fight.21
13 Id.
14 Tauscher, supra note 8.
15 Report of GGE, supra note 2, 7.
16 Id.
17 See generally Cristiane Carneiro, From the United Nations Arms Register to an Arms Trade Treaty
- What Role for Delegation and Flexibility?, 14 ILSA J. IrMr'L & COMP. L. 477 (2008).
18 Id. at 478.
19 Id. at 479.
20 Id.
21 United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its As-
pects, July 9-20, 2001, U.N. Programme ofAction to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in
Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, 5, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.192/15 (July 20, 2001) [herein-
after Conference on Illicit Trade].
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The U.N. Register failed to cover the transfer of small arms, so it became
apparent that this issue needed to be addressed on an international level. 2 2 The
first attempt was made in 2001, with the passing of the U.N. General Assembly's
Protocol Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their
Parts and Components, and Ammunition. 2 3 Additionally, the U.N. held the Con-
ference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects,
which led to a Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat, and Eradicate the Illicit
Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects in 2001 .24
This Programme of Action was an attempt by the U.N. to memorialize what
the member nations believed was an effective method for registering, manufac-
turing, trading, and maintaining a safe market for SA/LW. 2 5 The Programme
sought to create global norms, develop and implement agreed measures, empha-
size particular regional problems, increase international cooperation and informa-
tion sharing, and promote responsible action by States.26 While this document
has been marginally effective in creating the standards it aimed to promote, after
a few years the U.N. membership began to desire more.
In December 2006, the U.N. General Assembly asked the Secretary-General to
seek the views of member states in regards to an arms trade treaty as well as to
put together a Governmental Group of Experts to assess the situation. 2 7 The
General Assembly, in taking this step, recognized that arms control, disarma-
ment, and non-proliferation are essential for the maintenance of international
peace and security, each state has a right to take legitimate self-defense steps, and
each country must respect international law, including human rights and humani-
tarian law.28 Nevertheless, it also recognized the need for a balance between
these goals and the safety of individuals around the globe.29
C. Recent American Attitudes Toward Arms Control
In 2001, the U.S. was far from amenable when discussions turned towards
arms control. John Bolton, then the U.S. Representative to the U.N. Illicit Trade
in Small Arms and Light Weapons Conference, stated that the U.S. "does not
support any course of action that constrains the legal trade and manufacture of
small arms." 30 The consensus in the George W. Bush Administration was that
any type of constraint would be bad for American business and might hamper
national interests abroad, especially as wars in Afghanistan and Iraq ramped up. 3 1
22 Carneiro, supra note 17, at 481.
23 Conference on Illicit Trade, supra note 21, 20.
24 Id. 1 1.
25 Id. T 9-14.
26 Id. 22.
27 G.A. Res. 61/89, 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/89 (Dec. 18, 2006).
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 Elizabeth Powers, Greed, Guns and Grist: U.S. Military Assistance and Arms Transfers to Devel-
oping Countries, 84 N.D. L. REV. 383, 416 (2008).
31 Id.
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However, U.S. policy changed courses in the latter half of Bush's presidency
as alliances became harder to cultivate. Robert Loftis, then the American Am-
bassador to the Organization of American States, said in an April 2005 speech to
the Organization of American States that the U.S. supports the 2001 U.N. Pro-
gramme of Action on Illicit Trade of Small Arms and Light Weapons. 32 He went
on to state that the U.S. sees an arms trade treaty as facilitating the timely, relia-
ble identification and tracing of illicit SAILW, which will be a goal of the current
administration as it strives to enact the proposed U.N. ATT.33
Secretary Clinton is fully behind the ATT proposition being discussed by the
preparatory committee. Secretary Clinton stated that the United States would
actively support the negotiations as long as the ATT "will improve the global
situation by denying arms to those who would abuse them." 34 To be sure, this is
a good sign for those who support an Arms Trade Treaty because, even as the
image of America as the last world superpower dwindles, America is still a pow-
erful country whose opinion matters to many nations around the world.
III. Discussion
A. Status of Current Regional Arms Control
The majority of current arms control safeguards around the world are at the
national or regional level. There are a number of agreements, such as the U.N.
Register previously discussed, that are only politically binding because the coun-
try itself did not pass or ratify the law.35 A legally binding instrument, which is
the goal of the ATT, would become part of the law of a nation if that nation
ratified it.36 Once ratified and legally binding, breaking or subverting that law
would have consequences.3 7
Politically binding agreements in place now, such as the Wassenaar Arrange-
ment and the U.N. Register, are voluntary.3 8 This has led countries that already
have national laws regulating arms trade to acquiesce to these agreements, mean-
ing little actual progress has been made because countries where illicit trafficking
exists without national laws are the real targets of an international arms trade
treaty. 39 In other words, until countries without national laws to regulate the
arms trade are willing to sign an arms trade treaty and adopt it as national law,
true progress is minimal.
32 Id.
33 Id. at 416-17.
34 Clinton, supra note 6.
35 Katherine Orlovsky, Note, International Criminal Law: Towards New Solutions in the Fight
Against Illegal Arms Brokers, 29 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 343, 369 (2008).
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Jonathan T. Stoel, Note, Codes of Conduct on Arms Transfers - The Movement Toward a Multilat-
eral Approach, 31 LAW & POLY INT'L Bus. 1285, 1288-89 (2000).
39 Id. at 1289.
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As mentioned above, states and regional organizations have attempted to add
layers to national laws to protect their citizens and foreign interests. The United
States and European Union (EU) have regimes in which they "attempt to identify
rogue states that act outside acceptable norms of behavior and bar the exportation
of weapons to these states." 4 0 This unilateral stance has created an international
system that forbids the movements of weapons to Iran, Iraq, Libya and North
Korea, via the Wassenaar Arrangement, but permits sales to any other country,
with constraints coming only from the laws of the receiving nation.4 1
While this may seem like a positive step forward, the problem with this ar-
rangement is its inherent leniency that allows for decisions based on several fac-
tors, not just who is on the other side of the transaction. In America, policy
guidelines are supposed to use a balancing test between the possibility that the
transfer "may exacerbate regional arms races or contribute to human rights
abuses" and "the effect on the U.S. arms industry and the defense industrial
base."4 2 Unfortunately, capitalism generally prevails under the theory that we
are aiding developing nations by giving them the means for self-defense, or at
least to balance the weaponization of a region.43
However, there have been some recent regional agreements that have seen
success. The best example is the European Union (EU) Code of Conduct on
Arms Exports.44 The EU's Code of Conduct sets out eight criteria for assessment
of applications for the export of conventional arms. Those eight criteria are: (1)
comportment with international obligations of EU member states (U.N. treaties,
other international treaties, etc.); (2) the respect of human rights in the country of
final destination; (3) the internal situation in the country of final destination; (4)
preservation of regional peace, security and stability; (5) national security of the
member states and of territories whose external relations are the responsibility of
a member state; (6) behavior of the buyer country with regard to the international
community, particularly attitudes to terrorism and alliances; (7) existence of a
risk that the weapons may be diverted in the buying country; and (8) compatibil-
ity of the arms exports with the technical and economic capacity of the recipient
country.45 The EU Code of Conduct sets out these eight criteria along with a
method of evaluating each criterion. Additionally, the EU Code established a
notification and consultation mechanism for denials and insists on transparency
throughout the entire procedure through the publication of the EU annual reports
on arms exports.46
40 Id. at 1287.
41 Id. at 1287-88.
42 Id. at 1288.
43 Id. at 1290.
44 The EU's Support for a Legally Binding International Arms Trade Treaty, COuNcrL OF THE EURO-
PEAN UNION, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/016_09-EN low.pdf (last visited Oct.
15, 2010) [hereinafter EU's Support for ATT].
45 1998 O.J. (L 75) 81.
46 EU's Support for ATT, supra note 44.
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The European Union also adopted a Strategy to combat illicit trade and exces-
sive accumulation of SA/LW and their ammunition.4 7 This document sets out a
few guidelines, but is particularly noteworthy as it came out strongly in favor of
international initiatives like the ATT. One of the strategic initiatives, in fact, was
to encourage the EU to foster discussion in other regional groups and with U.N.
member states throughout the world. 4 8
B. United Nations Renews Arms Control Effort
In December of 2006, the U.N. General Assembly adopted Resolution 61/89
entitled, "Towards an arms trade treaty: establishing common international stan-
dards for the import, export and transfer of conventional arms." 4 9 Within this
resolution, the General Assembly requested that the Secretary-General appoint a
group of governmental experts to examine "the feasibility, scope and draft pa-
rameters for a comprehensive, legally binding instrument establishing common
international standards for the import, export and transfer of conventional
arms."50 According to that Group of Governmental Experts (GGE), an ATT is
necessary for several reasons. First of all, globalization changed the dynamics of
the international arms trade.5 ' The types of weapon systems, equipment and
components manufactured were being developed through joint ventures between
states, allowing for faster development and increased production capabilities. 52
Second, the GGE noted that, on certain occasions, U.N. Security Council arms
embargoes were being violated because weapons were traded on illicit markets,
re-exported through illegal brokering, and unsecure weapons storage and trans-
portation allowed for re-direction far more easily than should have been the
case. 5 3 Further, the GGE observed that "such weapons could be used for terrorist
acts, organized crime and other criminal activities," all of which are now being
targeted by the ATT.54
C. The World Calls for an Arms Trade Treaty
In the first comprehensive collection of States' Views on an Arms Trade
Treaty, the reasons for promoting such a broad initiative restricting arms trading
became clear. There is growing support for a legally binding instrument negoti-
ated on a non-discriminatory, transparent and multilateral basis, to establish com-
mon international standards for the import, export and transfer of conventional
arms.55 There are three global concerns that have continually surfaced in discus-
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 G.A. Res. 61/89, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/89 (Dec. 18, 2006).
50 Report of GGE, supra note 2, T 1.
51 Id. T 12.
52 Id.
53 Id. 13.
54 Id.
55 G.A. Res. 63/240, U.N. Doc. A/RES/62/240 (Jan. 8, 2009).
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sions, and while they are not specific in nature, they have provided the basis for
further discussion: the impact of the arms trade worldwide, the changing nature
of the arms trade, and the inadequacy of existing arms transfer control
mechanisms. 56
At this point, it is undisputed that the impact of the arms trade reaches nearly
every corner of the world and "the absence of common international stan-
dards. . .is a contributory factor to conflict, the displacement of people, crime and
terrorism," that undermines peace, security and sustainable development.5 7 Sa-
rah Parker, who authored the U.N. study that categorized and analyzed states'
views on an ATT, wrote that in the context of civil conflict, illicit arms transfer
can contribute to the beginning or continuing of conflict, meaning that it is an
omnipresent danger in countries where strife is ready to strike at all times.5 8
Parker also notes that irresponsible arms transfers have an impact on develop-
ment, citing military expenditures that often divert financial, technological and
human resources from development objectives. 59 Furthermore, underdeveloped
and broken societies have compounded their own problems with misguided
weapons purchases, which have created widespread corruption and have had a
disparaging impact on economic growth and development. 6 0
Second, the changing nature of the arms trade has increased the concern over
how weapons are controlled, as old safeguards are no longer effective. The shar-
ing of information among nations has become far more widespread than it used
to be and although weapons development is in the hands of a few firms, the
increased cooperation leads to the necessity of adaptable regulation standards. 6 1
Parker continues by observing that technology has allowed more delocalized
sales and trade networks, making detection of illegal activities more difficult.6 2
Parker recommends that, by challenging illegal transfers on an international
level, the ATT will more accurately address the issues raised by a globalized
trade network.63
Finally, the international community has expressed concern over the inade-
quacy of existing arms transfer control mechanisms. Current instruments such as
the U.N. Register and the Programme against the Illicit Trade of Small Arms and
Light Weapons have already been discussed, but these mechanisms are insuffi-
cient for dealing with an evolving market.64 In the end, these documents must
not be considered failures; rather they should be recognized as steps in the con-
56 SARAH PARKER, IMPLICATIONS OF STATES' VIEWS ON AN ARMS TRADE TREATY 7 (Jan. 2008)
(report for the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research) available at http://www.unidir.org/
pdf/ouvrages/pdf-1-92-9045-008-B-en.pdf
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 Id. at 8.
61 Id. at 8-9.
62 Id. at 9.
63 Id.
64 Id.
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tinuing process, utilizing the past treaties as examples on what has worked and
what can be improved upon.
D. The United States' Outlook
As a result of our capitalist democracy and the incentives it creates, the ques-
tion raised in America during the Bush administration was, "what's in it for us?"
At the time, as reflected by the statements made by John Bolton to the U.N. there
was not much for the United States to gain, as it was already seen as the "bench-
mark" for arms trade regulation. 65 Moreover, America was and still is the
world's largest exporter of SA/LW, so more stringent regulations might dampen
the profit potential for many American companies in the industry. 66
However, in light of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United
States, the continued resistance in Afghanistan, and a war in Iraq, the United
States fundamentally altered its position because it now might benefit from the
ATT. The United States sees that the ATT could temper illegal arms trade in
regions where terrorism and internal strife are continuous threats.67
The United States must be active in the formation of this treaty in order to
continue giving aid to states in need as well as continue to provide SA/LW for
military preparedness. An ATT would successfully regulate the arms trade in-
dustry, while still allowing exporters to properly equip countries that cannot pro-
duce the means to defend themselves. 68 Regulation of the SAILW industry is
critical as recent history has demonstrated the devastating effects where regula-
tion is non-existent and the transfer of these weapons is like selling any other
commodity. 69 As Elizabeth Powers wrote, "The availability of SAILW adds to
the causes of conflict and generates a vicious circle in which greater insecurity
further increases the demand for, and use of, these weapons."70 The U.S. can see
this as the case, so it now must take action to prevent further abuses while main-
taining its own ability to sell weapons to allies who will use the weapons for
proper purposes such as self-defense.
The final reason the U.S. would benefit from an ATT is because it will further
the human rights goals the U.S. has set for itself and reflect these goals on an
international level.7n Already, the U.S. has joined the Organization for Security
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), which is committed to the principle that
"each participating State will avoid [arms] transfers which would be likely to be
used for the violation or suppression of human rights and fundamental free-
doms."72 Additionally, the Wassenaar Arrangement, to which the U.S. was a
65 Powers, supra note 30, at 416.
66 Id. at 406.
67 Tauscher, supra note 8.
68 Id.
69 Powers, supra note 30, at 415.
70 Id.
71 The U.S. Should Support an Effective Human Rights Rule in the Arms Trade Treaty, AMNESTY
INT'L 4 (July 1, 2010) (Index No. AMR 51/057/2010) [hereinafter AMNESTY INT'L].
72 Id.
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party, stated that "each Participating State will avoid issuing licenses for exports
of SAILW where it deems that there is a clear risk that the small arms in question
might. . .be used for the purpose of repression; be used for violation or suppres-
sion of human rights and fundamental freedoms."73
For America, there is a delicate balance that the Arms Trade Treaty must
strike. On one hand, the U.S. needs to protect the interests of businesses and
their right to trade weapons to those in need, as well as protect those individuals
in regions where these weapons could be used for improper purposes. That is
precisely why the U.S. government sees the value in supporting an arms trade
treaty.
E. Non-Governmental Organizations Call for Arms Control
There is no shortage of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) actively
campaigning for the ATT to become a reality. The main interest from these
organizations stems from the desire for increased human rights awareness and the
desire to see the rule of international law proliferate. 74
Control Arms, a coalition made up of over 25 different smaller NGOs, is a
highly active campaigner in ATT discussions.7 5 Control Arms heavily relies
upon statistics to support a swift implementation of an ATT, the most alarming of
which is that "[e]ach year, at least a third of a million people are killed directly
with conventional weapons and many more are injured, abused, forcibly dis-
placed and bereaved as a result of armed violence."76 It is apparent that the level
of casualties must be curtailed, so the Control Arms campaign is exerting as
much pressure on governments and regional organizations as possible to expedite
negotiations by actively lobbying national governments and other NGOs to join
the cause.
Much like Sarah Parker's U.N. backed analysis of states' views on an ATT,
Control Arms shows empathy for more than just those that are killed or injured
by arms. They are concerned for the development of entire nations, citing the
fact that "even outside of wartime, governments arms purchases can exceed legit-
imate security needs, diverting substantial amounts of money away from health
and education."77 For instance, Botswana, the Democratic Republic of Congo,
Nigeria, Rwanda, Sudan and Uganda each doubled their military spending from
1985 to 2000 while their people continue to lack basic essentials such as clean
water, food and housing.7 8 Control Arms advocates for inhibiting the flow of
73 Id.
74 Id. at 9.
75 See generally About Control Arms, CONTROL ARMS, http://www.controlarms.org/about-control
arms (last visited Nov. 11, 2011).
76 Updated - Facts & Figures, AMNESTY INT'L, http://www.amnesty.at/uploads/tx-amnesty/act300l7
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SAILW because "while weapons do not cause these conflicts, the continuing sup-
ply and misuse of easily available arms and ammunition fuels their continuation,
and makes them more deadly."79 As Control Arms bluntly notes, "[tihe human
suffering caused by collapsing economies, devastated health and security infra-
structures, disease and famine is horrifying."so
While NGOs do not necessarily call on a single country to completely drive
the process, there is a sense that the U.S. is in the best position to ensure that
certain elements are included in an ATT that will not only further the goals of the
international human rights community, but also those of the U.S. as well., Am-
nesty International gives credit to the U.S. for maintaining human rights as a
"central foundation of U.S. conventional arms export control law," but it says
that for an ATT to be useful, "a similarly robust standard" is necessary, espe-
cially one backed by the world's largest exporter.8 2
IV. Analysis
Not enough has been done in the international sphere. While there have been
legitimate attempts to quell the illicit transfer of arms, they have been insuffi-
cient.83 Previous attempts such as the Programme of Action have been volun-
tary, meaning the real culprits of discord and merchants of death have not been
subjected to the terms. It is now time for the world to commit to a legally bind-
ing ATT that will foster national laws in accordance with international principles
agreed to at the Arms Trade Treaty Convention in 2012.
A. A Legally Binding Arms Trade Treaty
By far, the most discussed issue in the preliminary stages of negotiations has
been that the new treaty will be legally binding on the countries that ratify it, not
simply politically binding as past agreements have been. 84 From the outset, the
goal has been to write a "legally binding instrument negotiated on a non-discrim-
inatory, transparent and multilateral basis, to establish common international
standards for the import, export and transfer of conventional arms." 5 The im-
portance of a legally binding ATT with a broad, multilateral framework and
clear, concise expectations cannot be overstated. These expectations and what
transfers will fall within the grasp of the ATT must be made known internation-
ally to minimize the number of illicit transfers. Thre must be no room to plead
ignorance of the ATT.
79 Id. at 25.
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B. The Scope of an Arms Trade Treaty
Two key issues are being contemplated for inclusion in the ATT though the
details are not yet resolved. The first issue is what categories of weapons or
items will be included on the list; the second issue is what types of activities and
transactions will be included.86
In regards to the first issue, a list of weapons must be included. The primary
question is whether the list will be one that already exists, such as the list used by
the U.N. Register of Conventional Arms, or if a new list will be created. The
likely resolution is the use of an existing list with simply modifications as many
of the lists include the obvious choices, leaving room for additions or subtrac-
tions.87 However, one main concern raised by several countries is that this list
should be unambiguous and to allow for easy updates so that new weapons can
be incorporated.88
Secondly, the scope of included activities and transactions must be deter-
mined. While a broad cross-section of activities and transactions is inherent in
the goals of the ATT ("import, export and transfer"), most states desire some-
thing more definitive, expressing what each of those singular terms encom-
passes. 89 Other terms that have been suggested include: "brokering" (laws about
who can broker and what can be brokered), "transit" (who is responsible for
regulation - exporting country, transitional country, or importing country), "re-
export" (guidelines for reselling arms and under what conditions this can be
done), and "intangible transfers and licensed production" (trading of manufactur-
ing knowledge or information). 90
C. Parameters for an Arms Trade Treaty
After the scope, the Group of Governmental Experts should discuss the param-
eters of arms transfers, specifically, what concerns the treaty should encompass
when deciding whether to allow an arms transfer to a country. 91 This will require
a survey of the regional agreements and national laws in existence to develop a
"best practice" idea to then be put in place on the international level. 9 2 It will
also require an ATT to take into account the current regional and international
commitments, embargoes, and U.N. Charter and Security Council Resolutions so
as not to create a situation where, by acting in accordance with the ATT, a coun-
try would violate duties owed in other circles. 93
The other major issue that must be considered when evaluating how far an
ATT can reach is whether the exporter must evaluate the likely use of the weap-
86 PARKER, supra note 56, at 12.
87 Id. at 12-13.
88 Id. at 13.
89 Id. at 17.
90 Id. at 18-21.
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ons by the end user. The most obvious consideration is whether these weapons
might end up in the hands of terrorist and organized crime groups. In that case,
the exporter will be expected, if not required, to refrain from making an arms
deal.9 4 In the same vein, diversion during legitimate transport will have to be
included as a subject, especially regarding who is responsible for shipments or
when responsibility shifts (if it does as at all).95 However, the GGE had not yet
considered diversion, thus, it is an open issue. This concern has bled into a dis-
cussion on selling weapons to non-state actors and whether there should be a
blanket ban on such transactions, though at this stage of an ATT, Parker believes
this subject will be left to future treaties. 9 6
D. Country Considerations Based on Likely Use of Transferred Arms
In short, the use of transferred arms to commit human rights violations is the
aspect where NGOs and the human rights movement hope an ATT would be
most effective. The conclusion of an ATT will likely stem the flow of SA/LW,
which, in the aggregate, do the most damage.97
But how far can the treaty go? Several states suggested a method for assessing
the level of risk when countries are being considered for a sale transfer of weap-
ons, but there is no consensus.98 The only sort of agreement that can be dis-
cerned at this point is to use the criteria established by the EU Code of Conduct
on Arms Transfers, but its ability to be adapted to the world level may not prove
so easy. 99 It will again be up to the U.N., much like with the earlier Register, to
maintain a database that all countries will abide by. Finland suggested that the
human rights bodies of the U.N., specifically The Human Rights Council, would
be in charge of those determinations, but even that resolution might have issues
depending on which country is a member of that committee at any given
moment. 100
E. Country Considerations Based on Likely Impact of Arms Transfers
Many states went beyond the impact on individuals and human rights to ex-
press concern for the states where arms transfers may hinder broader sustainable
development and regional stability. Both of these are complicated issues, mainly
because an exporter of arms is not necessarily oblivious to either one. In regards
to sustainable development, an ATT will likely address whether a country can
export weapons to a country where purchasing of arms should not be at the top of
the list on how they should spend money, but does the international community
94 Id. at 25-26.
95 Id. at 27.
96 Id. at 29.
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have the right to dictate such a judgment? 0' Additionally, exporters do not take
the monetary priorities of purchasing countries into account because their finan-
cial benefit is the same regardless of whether it is derived from a rich country or
a poor one. Parker refrains from making a suggestion in her U.N. report because
the topic is difficult to gauge based on the countries submitting views.10 2
Again, a selling country would also likely have to make considerations based
on regional stability; however, this is an inexact science because the country will
not make decisions devoid of their own interest in regional power balances. 0 3
For instance, the United States may want to continue weaponizing the United
Arab Emirates to have an ally in the Middle East with usable conventional weap-
ons should Iran take action, or alternatively, the U.S. may continue selling air-
craft and long-range weapons to South Korea in case North Korea takes military
action. Parker writes that an ATT must have criteria for objectively assessing
whether or not an arms transfer will have a destabilizing effect on a region.104
The final consideration on impact of arms transfers is whether the exacerba-
tion of an ongoing conflict will take place. Much like regional stability, export-
ers must consider the entire situation including neighbors of a country before
they allow weapons systems to cross borders and potentially fuel arms races. 0 5
In the end, the considerations that the GGE must address require guidelines
that are both specific enough to prevent misallocation of weapons and broad
enough that they are adaptable as new situations arise. Although this is a diffi-
cult balance to strike, an effective treaty created with multilateral cooperation
could save lives, ensure international human rights, and prevent further
destabilization or exacerbation of regional conflicts.' 0 6 The potential danger
must be weighed against the legitimate defense needs, economic considerations
of exporting countries, and the behavior of countries throughout transactions. 0 7
F. Range of Implementation Measures
As the U.N. General Assembly noted, "the political will of States to imple-
ment non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament obligations and commit-
ments and to participate in the associated verification agreements. . .is
crucial." 0 Though it is helpful for a State to simply sign an international treaty,
it is much more useful when the State ratifies it, incorporates it as a national law,
101 Note by the U.N. Secretary-General, Verification in all its aspects, including the role ofthe United
Nations in the field of verification, 14, UN Doc. No. A/61/1028 (Aug. 15, 2007).
102 Id. at 32-33.
103 Id. at 33.
104 Id.
105 Id. at 34.
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107 Id. at 34-36.
08 Panel of Government Experts, Verification in all its aspects, including the role of the United
Nations in the field of verification, transmitted by letter July 30, 2007, from the Chairman of the Panel
established pursuant to T 3 of General Assembly resolution 59/60 (2004), 14, U.N. Doc. A/61/1028
(Aug. 15, 2007).
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and then follows through on that commitment "to share information, allocate
resources, use available verification mechanisms and deal with cases of non-
compliance."10
G. The Capacity to Implement an Arms Trade Treaty
In order for the ATT to take effect, it must be implemented, but this is not a
simple task. The U.N. recognizes, and several states agree, that international
cooperation and assistance will be vitally important.110 This means that countries
must be responsive to one another, allowing the exchange of information, crea-
tion of border control procedures, and collaboration in educating, training, and
offering legal assistance to other nations.I' No country is likely in a better posi-
tion to assist than the United States, which already has similar mechanisms in
place with personnel capable of handling the new procedures.
Another place developing states will look for assistance with implementation
is through the approval and publishing of detailed implementation guidelines as
part of the ATT.112 Approving states were apathetic as to whether this was in the
form of a checklist or standard form to be submitted, they simply wanted a
known set of guidelines so that implementation, application and problem resolu-
tion took place similarly in one country to the next, allowing for better under-
standing and more effective evaluation of pending transfers.' 13 In addition, a
more controversial topic, but most likely one that would set this treaty apart from
previous agreements is the desire for included recommendations for national leg-
islation." 4 For example, these recommendations include: suggestions for penal
and administrative sanctions for non-compliance; licensing systems that require
licenses for the export, import, and international transit of conventional arms;
marking of all SA/LW so that international tracing requirements can be met;
record-keeping for accurate compliance with external obligations; and establish-
ing a national agency in each country to oversee all of these different aspects. '15
H. Transparency and Accountability
One of the major problems with past international weapons transfer protocols
was that they did not increase transparency in the area."' 6 Without transparency,
accountability suffered and those agreements were viewed as unsuccessful.' " In
fact, individual national desire for increased accountability has kept the ATT on
109 Id.
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the bargaining table for so long.I'I Therefore, the most prevalent suggestion for
an ATT is a method for sharing information, including whether transfers were
denied or approved, information on authorized dealers, producers and carriers,
technical information to prevent illicit arms manufacturing and movement, expe-
rience and expertise, and information on national regulations.1 19 Another possi-
bility is the use of a mandatory reporting mechanism, as opposed to a voluntary
one used by the U.N. Register. 120 While this may take the form of an interna-
tional database maintained by the U.N., that question is up for debate and consid-
eration by the GGE.
I. The Problem of Compliance Mechanisms
Arguably the most challenging issue that any legally binding treaty must ad-
dress is compliance and enforcement. Many states will not appreciate being
questioned about their level of commitment and might not be willing to accept
such an intrusive verification mechanism.121 Parker suggests several possibilities
for verification, including, allowing a secretariat or other state party to request
clarification, a request-and-respond system that could lead to a fact-finding mis-
sion, and/or a requirement for interstate communication prior to a request for
clarification with a provision for on-site inspection. 122 However, all of these ap-
pear to have drawbacks, as some countries will target others to the point where
they might withdraw or disavow the treaty. The best solution is the final one
suggested by Parker's report: an international roster of trained auditors to carry
out spot checks on states' submissions to a register. 123 This method will ensure
that all countries are participating fairly without the added necessity of accusa-
tions and alienation.
The other compliance problem is enforcement. The enforcement problem has
two prongs: first, who will do the compliance monitoring, and second, if a coun-
try is found to be in violates the treaty, what penalties are available?
When it comes to a monitoring organization, the best suggestion is for a U.N.
body to be created or have the responsibility be added to an existing organ. One
country suggested that the Security Council essentially govern the entire process:
have it be in charge of investigating, penalizing and enforcing the penalization,
even though this will be a continued topic of debate throughout the treaty's
development. 124
In regards to consequences for nations who violate the treaty, the most popular
suggestion has been to institute either import-export embargoes or U.N. Security
118 Id.
119 PARKER, supra note 56, at 40-41.
120 Id. at 41.
121 Id. at 47-48.
122 Id. at 48-49.
123 Id.
124 Id. at 48.
204 Loyola University Chicago International Law Review Volume 9, Issue 1
The Destruction of Mass Weapon Distribution
Council sanctions.12 5 However, either option appears to lack support in practice
as studies have suggested that U.N. arms embargoes have done little to stem the
flow of weapons to target countries with few countries effectively enforcing the
embargoes or sanctions. 126 Other suggested consequences for violations are fi-
nancial penalties for misconduct or a lack of oversight, or temporary restrictions
and/or prohibitions on trading arms for gross failures.127 The question is far from
settled, but the U.S. could affect its resolution because their opinion is valuable
as a major player in both arms exportation and U.N. enforcement mechanisms.
V. Proposal
The United States should support and actively work for the development of the
United Nations Arms Trade Treaty. The ATT can be utilized to further several
U.S. goals, including winning the global war on terror, preventing nations such as
Iran and North Korea from building weapons stockpiles, strengthening current
alliances and winning new allies in countries in need of regulatory aid, and mak-
ing strides in the fight for human rights.
A. The War on Terror
The U.S. recognizes what is at stake in the negotiation of an effective, binding,
high-standard ATT. Ellen Tauscher, Under Secretary of State for Arms Control
and International Security stated:
The arms trade treaty negotiations will likely be long and difficult. Some
participants will be tempted to take the easy road of seeking the lowest
common denominator just to get a quick agreement from those states who
would like to continue to support. . .directly or indirectly. . .terrorists,
pirates and genocidal warlords for a quick profit or short-term
advantage. 128
Tauscher's words articulate the first goal that America could potentially reap
in an ATT: the world could see fewer terrorists equipped with the weapons that
make them most dangerous. SAILW that fuel insurgency would no longer be
available as widely on the black market. In short, the advantages of a regulated
world arms trade begin with the advantages the entire world can enjoy: safety
and security.
Additionally, Tauscher commented, "For the [ATT] to be effective at thwart-
ing irresponsible transfers, it must ensure that members effectively implement
national laws that criminalize such transfers and allow for the monitoring of com-
merce."12 9 America is in a spectacular position to affect the ATT despite their
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image being tarnished by ongoing regional conflicts recently in the international
community because the U.S. is still seen as a beacon of hope by many downtrod-
den people.
B. Prevention of Rogue States Obtaining Weapons
Iran and North Korea present a problem, but not one that is unique to world
power politics of the 20th and 21st centuries. Those two countries pose a legiti-
mate threat to neighboring countries when it comes to exacerbating regional con-
flict or even starting one because they have proven willing to engage in
inflammatory discourse and, on a small-scale, actually take military or covert
action. Therefore, the more widespread the international pressure, the more
likely countries will abide by their commitments, and the more difficult it will
become for rogue states to obtain weapons.13 0
The U.S. may in fact be able to more closely monitor what exports and im-
ports are going in and out of those countries. If the ATT develops an effective
mechanism for monitoring, the world will better be able to see what types of
armaments are being traded in the region, even tracing some of them to black
markets and into the countries where they are not supposed to be.
C. Strategic Alliances
If the U.S. demonstrates its commitment to all stages of ATT development and
negotiations, other countries, especially those dependent on America for trade or
other aid, will more likely be party to the Treaty. Countries understand that if
they take a risk by not signing the Treaty, the U.S. could limit trade and weapons
exports to that country, thereby leaving them in a vulnerable position., 31 Also, if
the U.S. decides to limit aid to non-signatory countries, other allies may follow.
The U.S. must understand and utilize its position and ability to control what
might be viewed as a watershed effect. If the United States participates, their
allies and their allies' allies will see the benefit in participation and ratification of
an ATT, but if the United States allows the Treaty to simply continue without an
active role, the entire process might be undermined.13 2
The U.S. must take a hardline stance, but must also be willing to help those
nations that may not be able to afford participation from the start. Tauscher
noted that if a country does not have the resources to implement safeguards in
their own country, then the international community will have to step up and
make available the necessary resources. 133 There is no better way to lead than
by example, so if the U.S. were to provide resources such as funding and training
to back the new treaty and its implementation, while making clear that those who
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participate will be rewarded and those who do not may face economic conse-
quences, America may succeed in garnering significant support for an effective,
legally binding ATT.
D. Human Rights
The U.S. maintains a pledge to aid human rights victims, thus participation in
an A7T takes that pledge one step further by taking steps to prevent human rights
crimes that victimize innocent people. Tauscher noted, "[t]he treaty is worth
doing because it can have, unlike many things we do, a more immediate impact.
Lessening the arms trade can lead to less killing and maiming." 34
However, the biggest issue lies in getting the countries that speak about aiding
human rights to actually follow through with their commitments. 1 3 5 Contempo-
rary history shows that countries with little or no intent to comply with human
rights initiatives are more than willing to sign any treaty, knowing that there is
nothing in their home country that will require fulfillment of their promises. 13 6
This will be an incredibly difficult issue, but the U.S. must not be deterred. In-
stead, the U.S. must hope and understand that increased political pressure can
bring about positive change elsewhere.
The United States must demand that the highest ethical standards are included
in the treaty in order to garner support, and make a pledge to abide by them. By
doing this, NGOs will support the treaty more fully, and those NGOs, despite not
having political power, have been able to harness valuable voices through the
arena of public opinion. Governments often find it hard to ignore their own
people when they are calling for a new program or assistance, therefore, with the
backing of NGOs, States will hear the call for an ATT and hopefully answer in
the affirmative.
VI. Conclusion
The United States should fully support the writing and development of the
Arms Trade Treaty, while garnering allies to ensure the eventual effectiveness.
The U.S. can utilize this opportunity to further national goals such as the war on
terror, specifically stemming the tide of illegal weapons into the hands of ter-
rorists and militants who seek to injure Americans, their allies, and other peaceful
nations. However, the U.S. will likely have to keep an open mind, monetary
resources available, and political will to achieve the "strong and robust" treaty it
desires.' 3 7
It will be important for the White House and State Department to channel
resources and open lines of communication to allies around the world to garner
support for the ATT. The ATT can provide another avenue for pursuing interna-
tional peace, fighting the war on terror, leading the battle for human rights, and
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strengthening alliances through diplomatic means while actual armed conflict
winds down under the Obama administration. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan
have lasted longer than anyone might have guessed in 2001; therefore upping the
ante in the diplomatic fight against terrorism could save more lives both within
the army and civilian populations.
The ATT is an opportunity for the world to begin to control and diminish a
problem that has caused great atrocities and continues to plague third world
countries. If the U.S. is actively involved, other countries are likely to follow.
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